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P

rivatization of public assistance in the United States accelerated noticeably in
the last fourteen years. The 1996 welfare reform law, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, joined a rising tide of initiatives
to “reinvent government” by using private-sector tools and entities to free government from the constraints of perceived excessive bureaucracy and constrictive civil
service rules.1 In the welfare-to-work area, privatization played a key and quite disturbing role in a very effective campaign to reduce the welfare rolls drastically. Moreover, contracting for services with private entities, both for-profit and nonprofit,
substantially diminished the effectiveness of traditional legal advocacy strategies.
Advocacy tools, be they rights to due process, sunshine laws, or public rulemaking
requirements, were designed with fully government-run systems in mind. In the face
of privatization, these tools are less effective.
In this context accountability can encompass two basic concepts: accountability to individuals for fair and consistent application of rules and—a more public conception of
accountability—the ability of poor communities and their advocates to affect welfare
policy. Here, picking up the conversation about the impact of privatization that took
place in Clearinghouse Review in 2002, I focus on the latter.2
In considering how privatized structures might be made more accountable, I describe
a case study from New York City of the devastatingly effective way in which a government agency, with little or no oversight, can use privatization to impose harsh poliPersonal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).

1

See Clearinghouse Review’s special issue, The Implications of Privatization on Low-Income People, 35 Clearinghouse Review
(Jan.–Feb. 2002).
2
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cies. When framed within broader shifts
in governing mechanisms, the case study
also sheds light on how the advocacy
community might respond. Ultimately I
suggest that, besides continuing to insist
that government conform to preexisting
rights norms and slow or stop privatization when it creates harm, poverty lawyers and poor communities must work
together to design and use new accountability mechanisms that engage with
privatized structures directly.
I.	 Case Study: Welfare Reform and
Privatization in New York City

The story of welfare privatization, nationally and in its implementation in
New York City, tells a disturbing story of
how the change in governing structures,
from public to private, led to the imposition of profoundly punitive policies with
little to no oversight. At the same time
the advocacy communities’ struggle to
respond teaches important lessons for
moving forward.
A. The National Context: A Move
Toward Privatization

The move to welfare privatization arose
in large part from two significant shifts
in federal law. First, a provision of the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act allowed
states and localities to contract out eligibility determinations for Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF),
creating a new and potentially tremendously lucrative market for the for-profit
sector.3 Second, the statute devolved authority for setting welfare policy from
the federal government to states and localities. The Act envisioned widespread
state and local experimentation and, in
many ways, paralleled the incentive contracts that would emerge in the welfareto-work arena. States were given a fixed
block grant, comparatively few man-

dates, and enormous motivation to lower
their welfare caseloads by any means
they saw fit. The federal government’s
message to the states was crystal clear: if
you cut the welfare rolls, you will be rewarded financially, and, to a far greater
degree than was true under the Aid to
Families with Dependent Children program, we will not hold you accountable
for the means by which you achieve this
goal. These twin invitations—to privatize
provision of services and to use virtually
any means to lower the rolls—created an
ideal environment for a growth in the
role of private entities.
And grow that role did. The most recent national survey reported that in
2001 forty-nine states and the District
of Columbia used contracts with private
entities to provide some welfare services.4 Spending under these contracts exceeded $1.5 billion, which was at least 13
percent of federal TANF and state noncash assistance expenditures. If the use
of private entities grew, the use of forprofit entities grew exponentially. Of the
$1.5 billion, 13 percent went to for-profit
entities by 2001.5
B. Welfare Reform and Privatization
in New York City

Welfare reform of the kind envisioned
by the 1996 federal law began in earnest
in New York City a year earlier. In 1995
Mayor Rudolph Giuliani and Human
Resources Commissioner Jason Turner
initiated a wide-ranging set of welfare
reforms designed, in the words of Commissioner Turner, to create “a crisis in
welfare recipients’ lives, precipitating
such dire prospects as hunger and homelessness.”6
The move to privatization came a few
years later. In 1999 the Giuliani administration put out for bid $500 million in
contracts to provide welfare-to-work

42 U.S.C § 604a(a)(1)(A) (2001).

3

4
See U.S. General Accounting Office, GAO-02-245, Welfare Reform: Interim Report
Oversight of State and Local Contracting 8 (2002), http://bit.ly/eGP8TB.

on

Potential Ways

to

Strengthen Federal

Id.

5

Committee on Social Welfare Law, New York City Bar, Welfare Reform in New York City: The Measure of Success § I.C (Aug.
2001), http://bit.ly/fVxcL0 (citing Commissioner Jason Turner, Address at the Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of Government
(Nov. 1998)) [hereinafter Welfare Reform in New York City].
6
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services for public assistance recipients.7
Privatization of these services proceeded
and expanded over the next several years
through contracts to conduct employment assessments, serve individuals
who alleged physical and mental impairments that interfered with their ability
to work, and provide a variety of other
services. The contracts were generally
performance-based, that is, contractors
were paid only when they met performance goals for a particular client.

roll reductions, advocates could have
concurred with the administration that
welfare reform was a success—but, as was
the case nationwide, such improvements
did not occur.11 The social safety net was
largely dismantled; families remained
steeped in deep poverty and ever more
vulnerable to the vagaries of the lowwage labor market.12

1.	 The Advocacy Community’s
Response to Welfare Reform

While the traditional forms of advocacy,
such as litigation and lobbying, affected privatization only indirectly, other
efforts faced the issues arising from
privatization more squarely. In 1999
the Giuliani administration sought to
let $500 million in contracts with private entities to provide welfare-to-work
services.13 Almost immediately the bidding embroiled the administration in a
scandal. City Comptroller Alan Hevesi
investigated allegations that the administration violated fair bidding rules by
engaging in “wide-ranging discussions
… on its ‘welfare reform efforts’” with
officials at Maximus Inc., the eventual
recipients of the largest share of the contracts, five months before its first informational meeting with other prospective
bidders.14 The comptroller engaged in a
protracted but ultimately unsuccessful
effort to stop the letting of a contract to
Maximus.15

Central among the advocacy community’s strategies were class action lawsuits
to stop or slow the implementation of key
welfare reform initiatives and a series of
lobbying and organizing efforts to blunt
the harshest effects of reform.8 The litigation slowed implementation of welfare
reform and ensured some adherence to
both due process and substantive rights.
Similarly lobbying preserved some protections that had been assured under Aid
to Families with Dependent Children,
TANF’s predecessor.9 Nevertheless,
evaluated solely on the basis of whether
the rolls plummeted, welfare reform was
disturbingly effective. Between 1994 and
2010, the welfare rolls in New York City
plummeted an astounding 69.6 percent.10 If parallel improvements in the
economic circumstances of former welfare recipients had accompanied those

2.	 The Advocacy Community’s
Response to Privatization

See id.

7

Among the litigation efforts was Reynolds v. Giuliani, 35 F. Supp. 2d 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), which challenged the conversion
of welfare centers from Income Support Centers to “Job Centers” on the ground that the agency was “preventing people
from applying for Medicaid, food stamps, cash assistance, and emergency assistance in violation of federal and state
statutory and constitutional law” (id. § II.A.1). For an in-depth look at the litigation efforts of the advocacy community
from 1996 forward, see National Center for Law and Economic Justice, Case Developments (1996–2004) (n.d.), http://
bit.ly/dEFWg5.

8

9
See, e.g., Stephen Loffredo, Poverty Law and Community Activism: Notes from a Law School Clinic, 150 University of
Pennsylvania Law Review 173, 193–96 (2001) (discussing the lobbying campaign spearheaded by the Welfare Rights Initiative,
a community-based organizing group, and supported by a City University of New York Law School clinic to expand access
to education and training through amendments to state legislation and characterizing those changes as reclaiming ground
lost as a result of welfare reform).

New York City Human Resources Administration, Cash Assistance Recipients in NYC 1955–2010 (2011), http:scr.bi/hKOtdu.

10

11

Welfare Reform in New York City, supra note 6 (discussing rise in hunger and homelessness).

12

See, e.g., id § II.A.1.

13

Id.

Nina Bernstein, Company Had Head Start Preparing Bid in Welfare-to-Work Program, New York Times, March 10, 2000,
at B6.

14

15

See Welfare Reform in New York City, supra note 6.
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In 2004 and 2005 a grassroots organization in New York City began to research
the effectiveness of welfare-to-work
contracts. The organization, Community
Voices Heard, describes itself as comprising “low-income people, predominantly women … on welfare, working to
build power in New York City … to improve the lives of our families and communities.”16 The report that it published
is one of the few pieces of qualitative research documenting the difficulties welfare recipients experience in privatized
service environments.17 The report contains essential data on how privatization
harms poor communities, augments and
legitimates an organizing campaign to
improve welfare policy, and offers an effective model of advocacy to address the
harms of privatization.
Community Voices Heard studied the effectiveness of New York City’s contracts
with private vendors for provision of
welfare-to-work services.18 Taking the
city at its word that the program’s main
goal was to move people from welfare to
work, Community Voices Heard’s researchers “set out to uncover whether
or not currently operating job readiness
and job placement programs accomplish
their intended goals, what stands in their
way, and how they might be improved to
better serve the needs of the clients, the
providers, and the system at large.”19 With
few exceptions, the researchers found a
system that was almost completely failing to meet its stated goals.
The contracts were entirely performancebased, meaning that vendors were paid
16

only when a client reached a particular
outcome. The city projected that of the
individuals who enrolled in the program,
46 percent would be placed in jobs, 35
percent would retain their jobs for three
months, and 25 percent would retain
them for six months. The actual outcomes
were far less impressive. Of the average
of 4,144 people who were referred into
the system each month, only 8 percent,
or 346, were placed in employment; of
those, 43 percent (149 individuals) still
had their jobs after three months and 35
percent (121 individuals) had their jobs
after six months. The program referred
clients to jobs that offered low salaries,
little stability, and very little chance of
escaping poverty. Of those with Employment Services and Placement vendorreferred jobs, 75 percent earned $8.00 per
hour or less and 19 percent were referred
to part-time positions; many of the fulltime positions were temporary. Of those
whose job placements allowed closure of
their welfare cases, 29 percent returned
to public assistance within six months and
36 percent were unaccounted for.
Given the low placement and retention figures, Community Voices Heard
focused large portions of the report on
documenting what happened to the 92
percent who were not placed and what
led to the low placement outcomes. Sanctions were imposed on a disturbingly
high number of individuals for failure
to comply with rules. Of those referred
to vendors by the agency each month, 76
percent (an average of 3,149 people) fell
into this category either because they did
not attend the program at the start (30

Community Voices Heard, Our Mission (n.d.), http://www.cvhaction.org.

Sondra Youdelman & Paul Getsos, Community Voices Heard, The Revolving Door: Research Findings on NYC’s Employment Services
Placement System and Its Effectiveness in Moving People from Welfare to Work 21 (2005), http://bit.ly/ekVPsN [hereinafter
Revolving Door]. But see Frank Munger, Dependency by Law: Poverty, Identity, and Welfare Privatization, 13 Indiana Journal of
Global Legal Studies 391 (2006). Relying on extensive focus group interviews with welfare recipients and other actors in the
social welfare system in Buffalo, New York, Professor Munger relates a fascinating account of the effects of privatization
and other aspects of welfare reform on the self-perception of women receiving welfare (id. at 392).
17

and

18
Revolving Door, supra note 17, at 2. The program studied was New York City’s Employment Services and Placement
program, which was designed to serve approximately 27,000 clients per year at a cost of approximately $43 million (id.
at 28). Individuals participated for thirty-five hours per week for a maximum of six months. For the first two weeks of the
program, they spent all their time with the private vendor, engaging in assessment, job readiness, and job search activities. Subsequently they spent two full days a week at the vendor’s site and three days in a work experience placement
at another site. The goal of the program, according to city documents, was to “assist all non-exempt” applicants and
participants in achieving self-reliance through paid employment (id. at 27).

Id. at 13. In order to evaluate program effectiveness, Community Voices Heard analyzed agency documents obtained
through Freedom of Information Act requests, performed a random survey of 600 clients, interviewed staff members from
all but one of the vendors, and conducted twelve in-depth client interviews (id. at 17–18).

19
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percent of those referred) or because the
agency found failure to comply with one
or more of myriad program rules later
in the process (46 percent of those referred). This contrast between the 121
people who still had jobs after six months
and the more than 3,000 people punished monthly represented, in Community Voices Heard’s estimation, an utterly
failed system. Despite these clear failures, when the city redesigned and rebid
the contracts in 2006, contract incentives
were modified only slightly, and the same
vendors received new contracts.
These two pieces of data—that the overwhelming majority of recipients ended
up sanctioned rather than employed and
that contracts were nonetheless re-let
to the same vendors on similar terms—
suggest something quite disturbing. As
noted above, welfare reform has been
deemed a success in large part because
of the radical reductions in caseload.
However, those reductions have not
been accompanied by advancement of
welfare recipients in the labor market.
The employment services and placement program, though promoted as one
designed to move people into the labor
force, appear much more successful at
punishment than at placement. Given
the agency’s apparent endorsement of
these outcomes through the re-letting of
contracts to the same vendors, one can
speculate that the agency endorsed these
devastating outcomes.
3.	 Privatization Incentives: The
Motivating Forces Behind Failure

Community Voices Heard’s report not only
documented the failures of the welfareto-work system but also identified the
systemic problems that led to these outcomes. The report’s wide-ranging criticisms noted problems that predicted failure, including the lack of experienced job
developers and inadequate curriculum

for job skills training. For the purposes of
this discussion, however, the most interesting critiques focused on how both the
formal contract terms, and the formal and
informal contract performance monitoring, failed to create meaningful employment.20 The report particularly criticized
lack of access to education and training
and the contractual disincentives to serving clients whose path to work would be
challenging.
State law requires that in many circumstances the agency honor a client’s
preference for education or training,
and 71 percent of clients wanted to attend education or training.21 But one in
three clients “did not know that education and training might satisfy a portion
of their work requirements,” and only
18 percent of participants attended such
programs.22 The report pointed to the
structure of the contract payment system
as the reason for failing to provide education and training.23 Because vendors
were paid only for job placement and
retention, they focused their efforts on
placement as the most likely strategy to
improve their rates and thus their payment. Performance incentives led them
to “cream”—to select out and serve those
who were easier to serve, and avoid serving those with greater needs. The contracts offered no incentive to place people in education and training.
Community Voices Heard reported that
vendors were “discouraged from working with clients for the long amount of
time often necessary to address barriers
and [were] instead encouraged to sanction them.”24 As one vendor reported,
“[t]he incentives are structured in a way
that encourages vendors to work with
those easiest to place quickly, and leave
behind those that need more support and
more time for initial placement. Clients
realize this and grow wary of a system
that is failing to meet their needs.”25 Ven-

20

Id. at 69–71.

21

N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 335 (McKinney 1997); Revolving Door, supra note 17, at 64.

22

Revolving Door, supra note 17, at 53.

Id. at 69–71.

23

Id. at 8.

24

Id.

25
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dors also consistently reported informal
pressure by the agency to punish rather
than to serve clients.
The report documents what many
have always known about privatization
through contracting: despite robust legal
rules, contract incentives govern vendor behavior. Moreover, performance is
shaped not only by formal contract incentives but also by informal monitoring mechanisms. When the city agency
pushed vendors to sanction clients rather than deliver services, this dynamic
became clear.
Although Community Voices Heard,
through great effort, uncovered and reported these data, the contract terms and
contract monitoring structures that led
to these outcomes were created with little
or no public scrutiny. Thus privatization
was an extraordinarily effective mechanism to design and implement a program of highly punitive welfare policies
without public input or initial scrutiny.
This lack of public input is precisely the
problem that I address here.
II.	 The Tools We Have

Traditional administrative law offers a
variety of tools designed to ensure that
the government, when it formulates policies, is accountable to the public and adheres to fundamental democratic norms.
Chief among these structures are freedom of information and sunshine laws
that require the government to give notice of administrative rulemaking and an
opportunity for the public to comment
and that require the government to allow members of the public to sue if an
administrative agency acts outside the
boundaries of its statutory mandate. Administrative law includes rules governing
procurement processes. However, these
regulatory schemas offer little to help
communities respond to the problems of
welfare privatization described above.
As a conceptual matter, freedom of information, sunshine, and notice and
comment laws—as well as causes of ac-

tion for exceeding statutory authority—
are predicated on a traditional concept
of administrative law: the administrative
agency, created and governed by enabling
legislation, in turn creates and implements rules that control the agency’s interactions with the public. To check what
would otherwise be inappropriate power,
the agency is subject to a variety of mechanisms designed to render its conduct
more democratic.
Each of these tools presumes that a government agency is the primary actor. If
the government is not the actor, whether
any of these laws applies is far from clear,
leaving in doubt the effectiveness of using
litigation to create accountability. Moreover, tools such as these traditionally apply when an administrative agency acts in
a quasi-legislative role, raising concerns
about the need to check inappropriate exertion of power. Historically, contracting
has not been viewed as quasi-legislative,
and so these protections generally do not
apply when the government is issuing
contracts.26 As a result, these protections
fail to solve the problems posed by welfare privatization.
Another body of public law that provides
some possibilities for public participation is that governing public procurement processes. However, this body of
law focuses almost exclusively on ensuring that the government receives a fair
price and avoids corruption. Given this
focus, public procurement rules provide
little in the way of public accountability to clients and communities. Although
traditional public law might offer less
than we might hope in a privatized setting, some emerging governance structures offer more promise.
III. Trends in Governance

Several current trends in administrative governance offer potential avenues
to enhance accountability. Like privatization, these governance trends raise
concerns about both their effectiveness
and their ability to ensure basic fairness. Nevertheless, both whether they

26
See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2) (2006) (excluding government contracting from the notice and comment provisions of the
Administrative Procedure Act).
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offer some potential to do good and
whether there are ways to capitalize on
these trends to create better programs
for poor communities are worth considering in light of the political popularity
and upsurge in use of these trends. Below
I describe these trends as well as some of
their potential problems and conclude
with a proposition that we embrace a
more robust and community-focused
version of them as a way to deal with the
public accountability problems at the
heart of welfare contracting.
The last decade has seen—along with increased privatization of government services—the creation both nationally and
internationally of governing structures
that move away from “command and
control” forms of law and regulation and
toward collaborative governing regimes
that invite local experimentation to meet
broadly defined objectives. Over time,
lessons can be adopted based on evaluations of a range of these experiments.
In theory these new governing structures
can lead to better programs because they
engage a broader number of actors and
can adapt to changing conditions.27
Two examples give some texture to these
trends. First, and quite close to welfare,
is the governing structure of the Workforce Investment Act.28 In place of a federal mandate to provide either particular
services or clear, individually focused
procedural rights, the Act adopts a broad
series of goals and a variety of structures
to foster community collaboration in
creating programs to meet these goals.
Enabling legislation mandates the creation of state and local workforce investment boards with broad membership
and extensive policymaking authority.
Boards are charged with designing programs, evaluating them, and redesign-

ing in light of those evaluations. The Act
envisions that localities and states will
share data to improve program design
over time.29
Similarly New York City’s Center for Economic Opportunity offers a prime example of trends in the governing structure
of poverty programs. Rather than tackling poverty solely through legislation,
New York City created “an innovation lab
to test a diverse new generation of antipoverty programs,” focusing on “the design, implementation, and evaluation of
innovative programs ….”30 Among the
center’s strategic approaches are “[u]sing
data and evaluation to improve programs
and allocate resources based on measurable results” and “[s]haring lessons
learned and advocating on a national level
for strategies shown to make a difference.”31 These highly touted federal and
local initiatives represent a trend in governing structures. They are most certainly
ripe for criticism of both their lack of legal
mechanisms to ensure that they treat individuals fairly and their lack of mechanisms to ensure democratic participation in policy creation. Nonetheless these
governing structures give communities
and advocates an opening through which
to seize on some of the participation and
evaluation methodologies to make programs more responsive to their needs.
Before embracing these structures, however, one should examine their flaws. At
their heart the new governing structures
rely on collaborators—the workforce investment board or New York City’s Economic Opportunity Commission—to set
goals, design and evaluate programs, and
redesign based on the evaluation. The
emphasis on broad participation and
evaluation is facially attractive, but the
theory assumes both a genuinely broad,

In academic circles these trends are referred to by a variety of terms; for an extensive discussion, see the articles from a
2009 symposium, New Governance and the Transformation of Law, 2 Wisconsin Law Review (2010). See also Law and New
Governance in the EU and the US (Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006).

27

28

Workforce Investment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2801 et seq.

29

Id. § 2832.

New York City Center for Economic Opportunity, Early Achievements and Lessons Learned (Jan. 2009), http://bit.ly/fuhpsn (see
Letter from Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg in front matter (“an innovation lab”) and Executive Summary 1 (“the design,
implementation”)).

30

31

Id. at 1.

Clearinghouse REVIEW Journal of Poverty Law and Policy

n

March–April 2011

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1809047

551

Responding to Welfare Privatization: New Tools for a New Age

collaborative structure and equality of
power among the collaborators. In poverty policy a collaborative body can easily
fail to reflect the real needs of poor communities. It can simply fail to facilitate
participation by poor communities, as
was the case both with the program that
Community Voices Heard studied and
with New York City’s Center for Economic Opportunity.32 The collaborative body
can also co-opt poor people and treat
them as tokens while giving them essentially no say, leading to similarly bad
results.33
Over a long history social welfare policy
has been used to subordinate communities and keep their residents available for
the low-wage labor market. Unless participation mandates are substantive and
shift dynamics sufficiently to give real
power to communities, this history will
persist. Government will simply continue to create policies and programs that
appear to help poor people but actually do
much more to subordinate than to support. I suggest that, rather than adopting
new governing structures wholeheartedly, poor communities and their advocates capitalize on the political emphasis
on participation and evaluation to create a community seat at the collaborative
table. This seat could make possible a
significantly more effective role for poor
communities in creating and evaluating
social welfare policy. What follows is one
possible structure for which advocates
might press. Because others could also
be effective and feasible in a particular
community, this proposal is meant more
as food for thought than as a blueprint.
IV. Community-Based,
Research-Driven Participation
as a Potential Response

Drawing on the concepts of collaboration, experimentation, and accountability at the root of new governing structures

and the lessons from the work of Community Voices Heard, and mindful that
successful community participation must
be robust, I propose, as a means to render
meaningful community participation in
the governance structure, the creation of
a body to monitor social service contracts.
Perhaps the most important attribute of
any monitoring structure is assurance
that substantial participation by welfare
recipients and low-income communities
is part of all aspects of the body’s work.
Such a structure would broaden the range
of participants in policy formulation and
augment and build on the political power
of community-based groups.
As proposed, the monitoring body would
be separate and oversee all aspects of
contracting for social services. It would
ensure that contracting processes are
transparent, that the voices and priorities of potential recipients of the service
are heard, and that these constituents
have the resources and structural mechanisms to influence contract terms.
The monitoring body could be created
by the legislative branch of local government or by publicly elected officials—
comptrollers, public advocates, and the
like—whose offices engage in oversight
functions. The body could receive substantial structural support from private
funding sources concerned with the accountability and effectiveness of social
service contracts.34 The body could be
a separately staffed organization or an
ongoing committee with organizational
members, such as the local workforce
investment boards that are mandated by
the Workforce Investment Act.
Successful monitoring bodies must have,
in addition to community control, two
basic characteristics: (1) an altered notice and comment structure in the procurement process and (2) mandates to
enable the monitoring body to design and
implement an ongoing research agenda.

For an extensive discussion of the accountability of New York City’s Center for Economic Opportunity, see my Governance,
Accountability and the New Poverty Agenda, 239 Wisconsin Law Review 269 (2010).

32

This often occurs in local Workforce Investment Act implementation; see my Welfare Reform, Privatization and Power:
Reconfiguring Administrative Law from the Ground Up, 74 Brooklyn Law Review 275 (2009).

33

Given the current emphasis on evaluation among private funders, efforts to fund these initiatives through a combination
of public and private sources may well be successful. For some examples of this focus, see Ford Foundation at http://bit.ly/
etTOau and Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation at http://bit.ly/eQcGuU.

34
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Regarding the first, to advance the values
of government transparency and public
accountability, as well as to create structures that strengthen the political clout of
traditionally subordinated communities,
procurement policies must be amended
to invite substantial input from both the
public and the monitoring body. This
element is important because, as privatization has taken hold, contract terms
have largely replaced regulations. In the
welfare-to-work area, contracting is a
closed process with little opportunity for
participation by affected communities.
Thus any accountability structure must
incorporate into the procurement process traditional public law concepts of
government transparency and opportunity for public participation. Among the
changes needed are publishing proposed
contract terms concerning performance
measures before the terms are adopted;
instituting a comment period during
which the monitoring body, along with
the general public, can evaluate the proposed performance measures and make
recommendations; and publishing comments received from the monitoring
body and the public, along with agency
responses. These mechanisms would
give both members of the community
and the monitoring body access to terms
and the chance to comment on them before their use in an executed contract.
Second, among the principles of new
governing structures that are particularly
attractive in this context are the emphasis on experimentation, evaluation, and
flexibility to redefine programs in response to successes and failures. As every
good social science researcher knows,
however, the quality of any evaluation
depends on the quality of the questions
asked and the ability of researchers to get
real answers. The role of the proposed
monitoring body is, in large part, to provide ongoing evaluation that is driven by
the self-articulated needs of program clients. To effectuate this agenda, the body
must be able to force government actors
and private entities to record and make
publicly available data on outcomes that
the monitoring body identifies, whether
or not those outcomes are included in
the contract terms. The monitoring body

must also have ongoing access to program participants as well as government
and private staff involved in designing
and implementing the program.
Like the need for substantial control
by program participants above, this
research-focused proposal represents
a significant departure from traditional
administrative law concepts as well as
from participatory governance concepts.
Like the necessity for community control,
this element responds to the problems of
new governing structures when dealing
with traditionally subordinated populations and the need to account explicitly
for disproportionate power in designing
contracting processes. A robust ability to
force collection and publication of data is
essential in lending political weight to a
monitoring body.
A fundamental contradiction lies at the
heart of this proposal. Perhaps the government’s historic and current role in
creating and implementing social welfare
policy is so fundamentally intertwined
with initiatives such as welfare reform
and the contracts described by Community Voices Heard that reliance on government to create and monitor contracts
for the provision of social services would
seem inevitably to continue this history
of subordination. Thus there is a certain
irony in advocating the creation of monitoring bodies by and with the government. If the history is determinative, the
proposal is likely to be politically unfeasible to implement or to be co-opted in
a way that fundamentally undermines its
strength. My belief that a better outcome
is possible comes from a few observations. First, the technocratic efficiency
justifications that are the public face of
privatization are also its Achilles’ heel.
Community Voices Heard’s analysis of
outcomes, when framed as a matter of
economic efficiency, bolsters less politically charged and highly credible assertions that funds are being wasted; the
analysis may motivate other branches of
government or quasi-governmental bodies to step in to improve outcomes. While
that does not lead, per se, to communityled monitoring, it does offer a less overtly
political opening for communities to advocate additional oversight.
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Second is the presence, in at least some
communities, of community-based,
membership-led groups such as Community Voices Heard. The creation of a
monitoring body, even in a weaker form
than proposed here, offers a point of intervention, an additional site through
which organizations can assert themselves and engage in the politically contested questions of whose interests social
welfare programs should serve. And, in
turn, participation in such a body could
raise the institutional capacity of less
strongly established community-based
groups that might lead to increased political power.
■  ■  ■

A few words about limited advocacy resources: Having spent well over a decade
working on welfare issues in New York
City, I am well aware of the limited resources available to advocate on behalf
of welfare recipients and of the incredible necessity to continue to enforce
what few procedural, substantive, constitutional, and statutory protections still
apply. However, given the scale of privatization and its broad applicability to the
wide range of programs traditionally run
by the government, I urge that efforts to
confront privatization be expanded and
that others in the advocacy community
join forces with community-based organizations to advocate structures that augment genuine political participation and
respond directly to privatization.35

Along with Community Voices Heard, the National Center for Law and Economic Justice works extensively on these
issues in the welfare area (see National Center for Law and Economic Justice, Privatization and Modernization, http://www.
nclej.org/key-issues-privatization.php).
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